NO. 49242-3-II

COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON,

DIVISION II

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Respondent,

vs.

SARAH JEAN SEWARES,

Petitioner.

PETITION FOR REVIEW

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

A. *IDENTITY OF PETITIONER*

Sarah Jean Sewares asks this court to accept review of the decision designated in Part B of this motion.

B. *DECISION*

Petitioner seeks review of each and every part of the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the Lewis County Superior Court judgment and sentence. A copy of the Court of Appeals decision is attached.

C. *ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW*

> Does an unknown female's presence with a man a reliable informant claims is on his way to deliver heroin constitute a basis to perform a *Terry* stop on that female when the police do not suspect that she is carrying the alleged heroin and when the informant did not provide a basis of knowledge to support his claim of illegal conduct?

D. *STATEMENT OF THE CASE*

In December of 2015, Centralia Detective Adam Haggerty received information from a confidential informant that a person by the name of Christopher Neff would be traveling from the Puget Sound area in his silver-gray Series 5 BMW to the Motel Six on Belmont Avenue in Centralia to deliver multiple ounces of heroin to a local buyer who had rented room 254. RP 4-7[1]. The informant provided Detective Haggerty with a physical

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[1]"RP" refers to the transcript of the suppression motion held on 6/22/16 in this case. "RP 7/13/16" refers to the stipulated facts trial held on date indicated and "RP 7/27/16" refers to the sentencing hearing held on the date indicated.

description for Mr. Neff that matched police records the detective was able to review. RP 6-7. According to Detective Haggerty the informant had been working with state and federal police agencies for about two months in order to obtain the dismissal of his own charges and he had provided reliable information that aided in the arrest of other drug dealers and the seizure of relatively large amounts of illegal drugs. RP 4-6. As a result, Detective Haggerty believed the informant reliable even though the informant had not yet participated in any controlled buys of narcotics. RP 18. While Detective Haggerty believed the informant reliable, he did not say anything about how the informant came by his claimed information concerning Mr. Neff and his alleged illegal activities. RP 4-38.

Based upon the informant's claims, Detective Haggerty and a number of other officers set up surveillance at the Motel Six on December 23, 2015. RP 8-9. While stationed in the area the officers watched a white Cadillac DeVille drive into the Motel Six parking lot near room 254 after having picked up food from a local drive-through restaurant. *Id.* A female the officers did not know was driving the car. *Id.* The officers later identified her as Jasmine Hammond. RP 11-12. Mr. Neff was one of the passengers, as was the defendant Sarah Sewares, who was unknown to the officers at the time. RP 8-9. Once Ms Hammond parked the vehicle she, Mr. Neff and

the defendant got out and walked toward room 254. *Id.* Ms Hammond was carrying a black back pack that the officers thought might have the suspected heroin in it. RP 9. The defendant was carrying a purse. RP 42-43. No officer claimed to believe that the purse contained any heroin. RP 4-68.

As Ms Hammond, Mr. Neff and the defendant walked toward room 254 Detective Haggerty and a number of officers surrounded the trio with guns drawn and ordered them to stop. RP 10, 41-43. The officers then put each of the three in handcuffs while taking the back pack from Ms Hammond. *Id.* At this point the officers obtained permission from Ms Hammond to search the backpack. RP 11-12. Inside they found multiple ounces of heroin, methamphetamine, scales and other paraphernalia. *Id.* Other officers then asked the defendant if she had any drugs or weapons. RP 42-43. According to the officers the defendant responded that she had some methamphetamine in her purse. *Id.* With her permission the officers searched her purse, found the methamphetamine, and then placed her under arrest. *Id.*

After her arrest, the Lewis County Prosecutor charged the defendant with one count of possession of the methamphetamine the officers found in her purse. CP 1-2. The defendant responded with a motion to suppress

that evidence, arguing that (1) the officers had violated her rights under Washington Constitution, Article 1, § 7, and United States Constitution, Fourth Amendment, when they detained her without a reasonable basis to believe that she was involved in criminal conduct; and (2) the officers exceeded the scope of a valid *Terry* stop when they questioned her. CP 19-27. The court later held a hearing on that motion during which the state called Officer Haggerty along with two other officers as its only witnesses. RP 1-67; CP 28-29. Following their testimony and argument by counsel the court denied the motion, later entering the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

FINDINGS OF FACT

1.1 On December 23, 2015, Detective Adam Haggerty, Detective Chad Withrow, and Special Agent Hernan Rios were working in their capacity as law enforcement officers in Centralia, Washington.

1.2 Detective Haggerty was contacted by a confidential informant about Christopher Neff arriving in Centralia on December 23, 2015 to deliver a large quantity of heroin to a specific hotel room at the Motel 6.

1.3 This confidential informant had previously provided law enforcement with information related to narcotics distribution in the months prior to December 23, 2015, that had been corroborated through police investigation.

1.4 This confidential informants had also worked with federal authorities in other jurisdictions that led to the arrest of multiple individuals and the seizure of several pounds of cocaine.

1.5 This confidential informant provided law enforcement with a firearm that they claimed was involved in an unrelated offense.

1.6 This confidential informant was acting as an informant in consideration for pending criminal charges at the time the information about Neff was given to Detective Haggerty

1.7 This confidential informant also provided information about the location of Neff just prior to his arriving at the Motel 6 that was verified by observations of law enforcement, namely being at Arby's within minutes of his arrival.

1.8 Neff exited a vehicle with two female companions, Jasmine Hammond and Sarah Sewares, and all went to the hotel room the confidential informant told law enforcement Neff would be going to.

1.9 When she exited the vehicle, Hammond was in possession of a backpack that was not physically unique or specifically delineated as belonging to any one person.

1.10 Neff, Hammond, and Sewares were contacted by law enforcement outside the hotel room the confidential informant indicated Neff would be going to.

1.11 Hammond and Sewares were perceived as accomplices to Neff at the time of their initial contact by law enforcement.

1.12 While all persons were detained in handcuffs outside the hotel room, nobody was placed under arrest when initially contacted by law enforcement.

1.13 Sewares was in possession of a purse at the time she was detained.

1.14 Detective Withrow contacted Sewares and asked if she was in possession of any controlled substances.

1.15 Sewares stated that there was methamphetamine in her

purse.

1.16 Detective Withrow asked for consent to remove the methamphetamine from her purse, which was granted.

1.17 Sewares's purse was open when Detective Withrow contacted her.

1.18 Detective Withrow was able to see inside the purse without manipulating it and saw a topless pill bottle containing a large piece of what he recognized as methamphetamine.

1.19 When asked, Sewares stated the crystalline substance in the pill bottle was methamphetamine.

1.20 Sewares granted consent a second time for Detective Withrow to remove the methamphetamine.

1.21 Sewares was advised of Miranda warnings at this point by Detective Withrow.

1.22 Sewares again admitted to possessing the methamphetamine located in her purse.

1.23 Sewares was transported to a nearby police facility and asked about her involvement with Neff in this case.

1.24 Sewares provided details of what she knew about his case to Detective Withrow.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

2.1 The detention of all persons was lawful.

2.2 Sewares's detention was a lawful Terry stop.

2.3 The confidential informant in this case is credible and reliable.

2.4 A reasonable basis existed to contact and detain

Hammond and Sewares about their involvement in this case.

2.5 Statement made by Sewares to Detective Withrow do not violate the Miranda rule.

CP 33-35.

The defendant later submitted to conviction upon stipulated facts and received a standard range sentence. CP 36, 37-40, 41, 44-52. She then filed a timely appeal arguing, *inter alia*, that the trial court erred when it denied her suppression motion because the police detained her without a reasonably articulable suspicion based upon objective facts that she was engaged in criminal conduct. CP 53-62; *See also* Brief of Appellant.

By unpublished decision filed October 17, 2017, the Court of Appeals, Division II rejected the defendant's arguments and affirmed her conviction. *See* Decision attached. By order filed November 2, 2017, the same court denied the defendant's Motion to Publish. *See* Order attached. The defendant now respectfully requests that this court accept review, reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals, and remand to the trial court with instructions to grant the defendant's motion to suppress.

E. *ARGUMENT WHY REVIEW SHOULD BE ACCEPTED*

The case at bar presents this court with two separate bases for review: (1) under RAP 13.4(b)(1) the decision of the Court of Appeals is in conflict with this court's decision in *State v. Z.U.E.*, 183 Wn.2d 610, 352 P.3d

796 (2015), and (2) under RAP 13.4(b)(3), this case presents a significant question of law under Washington Constitution, Article 1, § 7. The following sets out these arguments. Under Washington Constitution, Article 1, § 7, and United States Constitution, Fourth Amendment, warrantless searches are *per se* unreasonable and as such, the courts of this state will suppress the evidence seized unless the prosecution meets it burden of proving that the search falls within one of the various "jealously and carefully drawn" exceptions to the warrant requirement. R. Utter, *Survey of Washington Search and Seizure Law: 1988 Update*, 11 U.P.S. Law Review 411, 529 (1988); *Welsh v. Wisconsin*, 466 U.S. 740, 749, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984).

As one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement, the police need not have probable cause in order to justify a brief investigatory stop. *Terry v. Ohio*, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968). However, in order to justify such action, the police must have a "reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts, that the individual is involved in criminal activity." *Brown v. Texas*, 443 U.S. 47, 51, 61 L.Ed.2d 357, 99 S.Ct. 2637 (1979) (emphasis added). Subjective good faith is not sufficient. *Terry v. Ohio*, 392 U.S. at 22, 20 L.Ed.2d at 906, 88 S.Ct. at 1880. *See generally* R. Utter, *Survey of Washington Search and Seizure Law: 1988 Edition*, 11 U.P.S. Law Review

411, § 2.9(b) (1988).

An informant's tip can provide police such a reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify an investigatory stop. *State v. Sieler*, 95 Wn.2d 43, 621 P.2d 1272 (1980); *State v. Lesnick*, 84 Wn.2d 940, 530 P.2d 243, *cert. denied*, 423 U.S. 891 (1975). However, the informant's tip must be reliable and the informant must have a basis of knowledge for his or her claims of illegal activity. *Sieler*, 95 Wn.2d at 47; Lesnick, 84 Wn.2d at 943. A tip from an informant is "reliable" and there is a basis of knowledge if the state establishes that (1) the informant has previously proved reliable or has a motive to provide correct information, and (2) the informant's tip contains enough objective facts to justify the detention of the suspect or the non-innocuous details of the tip have been corroborated by the police, thus suggesting that the information was obtained in a reliable fashion. *State v. Hart*, 66 Wn.App. 1, 830 P.2d 696 (1992).

In *State v. Z.U.E.*, 183 Wn.2d 610, 352 P.3d 796 (2015), this court modified this analysis and adopted a "total circumstances test" under which both reliability and basis of knowledge are still important factors but not exclusive. Specifically, in *Z.U.E.* this court addressed the issue of when the police may base a *Terry* stop upon information provided by 911 callers. In that case a number of 911 callers reported seeing a bald, shirtless man

carrying a gun "in a ready position" through a park in Tacoma that had a reputation as a gang hangout. A subsequent 911 caller, who identified herself as Dawn, stated that she had seen a 17-year-old female hand off a gun to the shirtless man. She gave a description of the female.

Upon hearing these reports two officers drove to the park, arriving within six minutes of the initial dispatch. Although the officers did not find anyone present, they did talk to a person who lived next to the park who told them that there had been a big fight involving a number of people. A short time later the officers found a vehicle in the vicinity with a female in the back matching the description of the 17-year-old who the 911 caller named Dawn stated had handed the gun to the bald, shirtless man. There were three other persons in the car. The officers then made a "felony" stop on the vehicle and arrested the 17-year-old for obstructing when she failed to follow the officer's orders. A search incident to arrest revealed that she had marijuana on her person.

The state later charged the 17-year-old with obstructing and possession of marijuana. The defense then brought a motion to suppress, arguing that the officers did not have the authority to detain the defendant based upon the uncorroborated claims of the 911 callers, who were themselves essentially anonymous. Although the court denied the motion

it did find her not guilty on the obstructing charge. The defendant then appealed her conviction for possession of marijuana. On review the court of appeals reversed, finding that

> [T]he 911 calls lacked sufficient "indicia of reliability" to justify the stop because (1) the callers were essentially unknown callers, (2) the officers did not know the factual basis supporting the caller's assertion of criminal activity, (3) the officers did not corroborate the assertion of criminal activity, and (4) the officers could not corroborate that the information was obtained in a reliable manner.

State v. Z.U.E., 183 Wn.2d at, 616-17.

The Court of Appeals also concluded that the officers' public safety concerns did not justify their decision to act on the less than reliable information.

Following entry of the Court of Appeals decision the state sought and obtained review. However, this court affirmed, holding as follows concerning the state's claim that the officers could rely upon the information provided by the 911 callers:

> Similar to the facts in *Sieler* and *Navarette*, the officers' alleged suspicion hinged on a named, but otherwise unknown, 911 caller's assertion that the subject was engaged in criminal activity. Specifically, the caller alleged that the female was 17 years old, and therefore a minor, which is the only "fact" that potentially makes the girl's possession of the gun unlawful for the articulated crime. However, because the caller did not offer any factual basis in support of that allegation, the officers could not ascertain how the caller knew the girl was 17 rather than, say, 18 years old. The officers knew nothing about Dawn (aside from her contact information), Dawn's relationship with the female, or why Dawn

> suspected that the girl had committed a crime in the first place. Although we presume that Dawn reported honestly, the officers had no basis on which to evaluate the accuracy of her estimation. We follow our holding in *Sieler* and conclude that this 911 caller's assertion cannot create a sustainable basis for a *Terry* stop.

State v. Z.U.E., 183 Wn. 2d at 622-23.

Similarly, in the case at bar, the officers did not provide the trial court with any factual basis to support the informant's claim of the alleged criminal activity. For all the trial court knew, and for all this court knows, the informant had simply heard a rumor that Mr. Neff would be transporting heroin to Lewis County. In addition, the police did not corroborate any of the claims of illegal conduct. Thus, in this case, there was no basis upon which to conclude that the informant had a basis of knowledge to support his claim of criminal activity. As a result, the trial court erred when it found that there was a basis for a *Terry* stop because the totality of the circumstances did not support a reasonable belief that anyone was involved in criminal conduct

In addition, even were there a basis to make a *Terry* stop on Mr. Neff in this case, this fact does not translate to a basis for a *Terry* stop on the defendant. At the time multiple officers approached the defendant with guns drawn, and at the time they handcuffed the defendant, they had never seen her before and they had no reason to believe that she had been

or was involved in any criminal activity at all. At worst she was merely in the proximity of a person whom they suspected possessed heroin. The defendant had not driven the vehicle that brought Mr. Neff to the hotel. Neither was she carrying the backpack in which the police found the suspected heroin. Thus, in this case and separate from the issue of basis of knowledge, there was no basis to make a *Terry* stop on the defendant. As a result the trial court erred when it denied the defendant's motion to suppress evidence.

In this case the Court of Appeals also erred when it upheld the decision of the trial court. Indeed, although Appellant argued that this court's decision in *State v. Z.U.E.* applied and required reversal of the trial court's decision, the Court of Appeals did not perform any analysis under *State v. Z.U.E.* and its applicability to the facts of this case. In fact, the Court of Appeals did not even mention its existence of *State v. Z.U.E.*. Thus, in this case, review is appropriate under RAP 13.4(b)(1) because the decision of the Court of Appeals is in conflict with this court's decision in *State v. Z.U.E.*, and under RAP 13.4(b)(3), because this case presents a significant question under Washington Constitution, Article 1, § 7.

F. *CONCLUSION*

For the reasons set out in this motion, this court should accept review of this case, reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals, and remand to the trial court with instructions to grant the motion to suppress.

Dated this 9th day of November, 2017.

Respectfully submitted,



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COURT OF APPEALS OF WASHINGTON, DIVISION II

STATE OF WASHINGTON, **Respondent,** **vs.** **SARAH JEAN SEWARES,** **Appellant.**	**NO. 49242-3-II** **AFFIRMATION OF OF SERVICE**

The undersigned states the following under penalty of perjury under the laws of Washington State. On this, I personally e-filed and/or placed in the United States Mail the Brief of Appellant with this Affirmation of Service Attached with postage paid to the indicated parties:

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Dated this 9th day of November, 2017 at Longview, Washington.

Diane C. Hays

Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two

October 17, 2017

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION II

STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. SARAH JEAN SEWARES, Appellant.	No. 49242-3-II UNPUBLISHED OPINION

MELNICK, J. — Sarah Jean Sewares appeals her conviction for possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine. Sewares contends the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress evidence seized from inside her purse. We affirm Sewares's conviction.[1]

FACTS[2]

A confidential informant (CI) notified City of Centralia Detective Adam Haggerty that Christopher Neff would be traveling to Centralia to deliver multiple ounces of heroin to a specific motel. This CI had previously provided both state and federal law enforcement with reliable information relating to narcotics distribution. The CI provided information to law enforcement about Neff's location prior to arriving at the motel. Law enforcement verified the information.

[1] Sewares also opposes appellate costs, asserting that she does not have the ability to pay because she is indigent. We decline to address the issue. A commissioner of this court will consider whether to award appellate costs in due course under RAP 14.2 if the State decides to file a cost bill and if Sewares objects to that cost bill.

[2] The following facts are taken from the trial court's unchallenged CrR 3.6 findings of fact, which are verities on appeal. *State v. O'Neill*, 148 Wn.2d 564, 571, 62 P.3d 489 (2003).

As the CI reported, Neff arrived at the motel. Neff exited the vehicle with two female companions, Sewares and Jazmine Hammond. All three walked to the motel room where the CI told the officers Neff would be delivering the narcotics. Hammond carried a back pack and Sewares carried a purse. Law enforcement perceived Sewares as an accomplice to Neff.

Officers handcuffed all three individuals outside the motel room. City of Centralia Detective Chad Withrow asked Sewares if she possessed any controlled substances. Sewares told Withrow that she had methamphetamine in her purse. Withrow then looked inside Sewares's open purse and saw an open pill bottle containing what Withrow recognized as methamphetamine. The detective retrieved the methamphetamine.

The State charged Sewares with possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine. Sewares filed a motion to suppress the methamphetamine seized from inside her purse. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that Sewares's detention was a lawful *Terry*[3] stop. Following a bench trial, the court convicted Sewares as charged. She appeals.

ANALYSIS

Sewares contends the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress the methamphetamine located inside her purse because law enforcement illegally detained her. Sewares argues the detention outside the motel room did not constitute a valid *Terry* stop. She further argues even if it was a valid *Terry* stop, Withrow exceeded the scope of the *Terry* stop by asking her if she possessed any controlled substances. We disagree with all of Sewares's arguments.

[3] *Terry v. Ohio*, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968).

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence to determine whether substantial evidence supports the trial court's findings of fact and whether those findings, in turn, support the trial court's conclusions of law. *State v. Russell*, 180 Wn.2d 860, 866, 330 P.3d 151 (2014). Unchallenged findings of fact are verities on appeal. *O'Neill*, 148 Wn.2d at 571. We review a trial court's legal conclusions de novo. *State v. Roden*, 179 Wn.2d 893, 898, 321 P.3d 1183 (2014).

B. LEGAL PRINCIPLES

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution prohibit a warrantless search and seizure unless the State demonstrates that one of the narrow exceptions to the warrant requirement applies. *State v. Garvin*, 166 Wn.2d 242, 249, 207 P.3d 1266 (2009). "These exceptions include exigent circumstances, consent, searches incident to a valid arrest, inventory searches, the plain view doctrine, and *Terry* investigative stops." *York v. Wahkiakum Sch. Dist. No. 200*, 163 Wn.2d 297, 310, 178 P.3d 995 (2008) (footnote omitted). A *Terry* stop requires a well-founded suspicion that the defendant is engaged in criminal conduct. *State v. Doughty*, 170 Wn.2d 57, 62, 239 P.3d 573 (2010). The police officer must be able to point to "'specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the] intrusion.'" *State v. Williams*, 102 Wn.2d 733, 739, 689 P.2d 1065 (1984) (quoting *Terry*, 392 U.S. at 21). If the stop goes beyond investigatory purposes, it becomes an arrest and requires a valid arrest warrant or probable cause. *State v. Flores*, 186 Wn.2d 506, 520, 379 P 3d 104 (2016).

The State bears the burden of showing that the search and seizure was supported by a warrant or an exception to the warrant requirement. *State v. Hendrickson*, 129 Wn.2d 61, 71, 917 P.2d 563 (1996). The exclusionary rule requires suppression of all evidence obtained pursuant to a person's unlawful seizure. *State v. Winterstein*, 167 Wn.2d 620, 632, 220 P.3d 1226 (2009). If the initial stop was unlawful or officers exceed the scope of a valid stop, the evidence discovered during the unlawful portion of that stop is inadmissible. *State v. Saggers*, 182 Wn. App. 832, 839, 332 P.3d 1034 (2014).

C. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW SUPPORTED BY FINDINGS

The trial court concluded the encounter between Sewares and Withrow was a valid *Terry* stop.

Here, based on the unchallenged findings of fact, a CI, who had previously provided both state and federal law enforcement with information relating to narcotics distribution, provided information that Neff would be delivering heroin to a certain motel room. As the CI reported, Neff arrived at the motel. Neff exited the vehicle with Sewares and Hammond. Each woman was carrying a bag. All three walked to the motel room where the CI told the officers Neff would be delivering the narcotics. Sewares was perceived as an accomplice to Neff.

Taking the above specific and articulable facts together with rational inferences from those facts, officers had a well-founded suspicion to stop Sewares. Thus, we hold that the trial court's conclusions that the initial stop was a lawful *Terry* stop is supported by the findings of fact.

We also hold that Withrow did not exceed the scope of the *Terry* stop by asking if Sewares possessed any controlled substances.

A *Terry* stop must be limited in scope and duration to fulfilling the investigative purpose of the stop. If the results of the initial stop dispel an officer's suspicions, the officer must end the investigation without further intrusion. If the officer's initial suspicions are confirmed or are further aroused, the scope of the stop may be extended and its duration may be prolonged. *State v. Acrey*, 148 Wn.2d 738, 747, 64 P.3d 594 (2003).

Here, Withrow was outside the motel room with Sewares based on a CI's tip that heroin was being delivered. The officer suspected Sewares was an accomplice since she arrived with Neff and walked with him to the motel room where the delivery was supposed to occur. Both Sewares and Hammond were carrying bags when they exited the vehicle. Since Sewares was detained during the investigation of a controlled substance offense, the officer's question whether Sewares possessed any controlled substances would be necessary to effectuate the stop.

Withrow was therefore entitled to ask a moderate number of questions to confirm or dispel his suspicions as part of the *Terry* stop. Withrow's question whether Sewares possessed any controlled substances did not exceed the valid scope of the *Terry* stop. Accordingly, Sewares's detention was lawful. The trial court properly concluded likewise. Consequently, the trial court did not err in denying Sewares's motion to suppress.

We affirm.

A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.

Melnick, J.

We concur:

Johanson, P.J.

Lee, J.

Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two

November 2, 2017

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION II

STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. SARAH JEAN SEWARES, Appellant.	No. 49242-3-II ORDER DENYING MOTION TO PUBLISH OPINION

Appellant, Sarah Jean Sewares, moves for publication of the October 17, 2017 opinion for this case. Following consideration, the court denies the motion. Accordingly, it is

SO ORDERED.

PANEL: Jj. Johanson, Lee, Melnick.

FOR THE COURT:

Melnick J.

Judge

JOHN A. HAYS, ATTORNEY AT LAW

November 09, 2017 - 12:33 PM

Transmittal Information

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